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BALANCING DISCLOSURE AND PRIVACY
INTERESTS IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE
Sarah Harding∗
The law of campaign finance pits two important First
Amendment interests against each other: disclosure and privacy. The
Supreme Court has recognized the need to balance these two interests
to allow for effective elections and to safeguard individual rights.
However, through the years the Court has failed to balance these
interests equally, resulting in vacillating decisions that unfairly
sacrifice one for the other. From Burroughs v. United States in 1934 to
Citizens United v. FEC in 2010, the Court has failed to provide a
workable roadmap for legislatures in the creation of campaign finance
disclosure laws and for lower courts in determining their
constitutionality. This Article argues that a balance between privacy
and disclosure can be struck by employing a “zone of constitutionality”
test. The Article proposes factors the Court could weigh in determining
whether a disclosure law falls within the zone of constitutionality.
Finally, the Article argues that clear guidelines are essential to balance
both interests; protect citizens and corporations’ First Amendment
rights; and avoid unnecessary litigation to the lower courts.

∗ J.D., May 2014, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; A.B. Political Science, Bryn Mawr
College, May 2009. Thank you to Professor Karl Manheim, Karen Roche, and the editors and
staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has recognized two significant, and
sometimes competing, First Amendment interests in campaign
finance: (1) disclosure and (2) privacy of campaign contributions and
contributors.1 However, the Court has not clearly defined an
appropriate method for balancing these two interests against each
other, and has not provided standards for how both courts and
legislatures should reconcile their discordance.2 The cases that
uphold campaign disclosure laws are in tension with those cases that
safeguard associational and political privacy.3 Further, the Court
sometimes has favored an approach that protects privacy interests
and at other times has favored compelled disclosure at the expense of
those very same privacy interests.4 Without authoritative guidelines
for legislators to follow, disclosure and privacy interests are
inadequately protected and unstable.5 Lawmakers and lower courts
have been left struggling to understand and apply the emerging
disclosure doctrine.6 The Court’s lack of guidance regarding how
these interests should be balanced—and its failure to consistently
balance the interests themselves—will have grim results: one interest
will be favored at the expense of the other,7 citizens and corporations
will risk losing First Amendment rights,8 and unceasing litigation
will flow to the lower courts.9
The First Amendment guarantees the right of free speech.10
However, there are two sides to this constitutional interest with
respect to campaign finance disclosure: one side favoring disclosure
1. Compare Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010), and Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct.
876 (2010), with NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), and McIntyre v.
Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
2. See infra Part III.
3. See infra note 132 and text accompanying Part II.C.
4. See infra Part II.
5. Chesa Boudin, Publius and the Petition: Doe v. Reed and the History of Anonymous
Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 2140, 2148–49 (2011) (asserting that the Court’s opinion in Doe v. Reed
was overly fact-bound and avoided providing lower courts with clear guidance).
6. Id. at 2150 (finding that the Court’s holdings in some cases, such as Doe v. Reed, fail to
create a clear standard or definitively answer the legal question, thus “guarantee[ing] confusion in
the lower courts”).
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part III.C.2.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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and one side favoring privacy.11 Disclosure provides information
about candidates and issues to voters.12 This disclosure facilitates an
uninhibited flow of information and ideas, which leads to the goal of
an informed electorate and an effective democracy.13 But forced
disclosure can also inhibit or “chill” political speech.14
Nondisclosure may be important to protect associational rights and to
encourage citizen engagement in political discourse.15 This Article
argues that the Court should protect both interests by appropriately
weighing their value and balancing them in each case, rather than
protecting only one at a time.16
Ideally, the Court should maximize and protect both interests, to
allow effective elections and to safeguard individual rights. The goal
of this balance is a transparent, open, and inviting democratic
process. Despite the seeming contraposition of these two values, this
Article argues that there is a “zone of constitutionality” where both
disclosure and privacy interests coexist. Lawmakers should aim for
this zone, and craft disclosure laws that represent, protect, and
balance these interests to the fullest extent possible. Although using a
bright-line test to protect both interests is probably impractical, the
Court should ensure that laws fall within the zone of constitutionality
by balancing both interests using a defined set of factors. The Court
must be clear about which factors it is considering and what weight it
is giving to them. This Article explains what this zone of
constitutionality would look like and the factors the Court should use
to ensure that laws fall within it. Part II explores the history of
disclosure laws and the possibilities and goals for balancing the
interests of disclosure and privacy. It diagrams the judicial landscape
11. See infra Part II.C.
12. See Richard Briffault, Two Challenges for Campaign Finance Disclosure After Citizens
United and Doe v. Reed, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 983, 990 (2011); Jonathan Turley,
Registering Publius: The Supreme Court and the Right to Anonymity, 2001–2002 CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 57, 61–62 (2002).
13. See Briffault, supra note 12, at 990.
14. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958); Dale E. Ho,
NAACP v. Alabama and False Symmetry in the Disclosure Debate, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 405, 413 (2012).
15. See Turley, supra note 12, at 75–78.
16. This Article utilizes a broad usage of the term “privacy.” Some scholars consider this
type of privacy to be anonymity. See, e.g., Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89
YALE L.J. 421, 433 (1980) (asserting that anonymity is one of privacy’s three elements). This
Article, however, will be using the terms “privacy,” “anonymity,” and “nondisclosure”
interchangeably.
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of the evolving disclosure doctrine, beginning with Burroughs v.
United States17 in 1934 and ending with Citizens United v. FEC18
and Doe v. Reed19 in 2010. Part II studies this volatile time in judicial
history and the Court’s vacillating holdings, which have advanced
disclosure at some points and privacy at others. It also lays out the
constitutional interests of both disclosure and privacy and explains
the likely effects of these juxtaposed interests on the First
Amendment’s right to free speech.
Part III exposes three principal problems with the current state
of the disclosure doctrine. The Supreme Court’s holdings have left
the disclosure doctrine without balance, without guidelines, and
without clarity. The result of these inadequacies could be severe:
chilled political speech, sacrificed privacy and disclosure interests,
and increased litigation.20 Unless the Court corrects these problems,
future lawmakers and judges will be unable to make consistent and
constitutional decisions regarding disclosure requirements, and
citizens will continue to face the loss of First Amendment rights.21
Finally, Part IV proposes factors that judges, justices, and
lawmakers should consider when assessing disclosure laws. Taking
these factors into consideration will help to maximize the interests of
both disclosure and privacy. To illustrate how these factors would be
used, this part applies the factors to past disclosure law proposals. It
analyzes whether these proposals would have struck the correct
balance between disclosure and privacy and thus landed within the
“zone of constitutionality,” where both disclosure interests and
privacy interests are best protected.
Ultimately, this Article does not support one interest over the
other. Rather, it concludes that disclosure and privacy must be
balanced within the context of election law. Each has a high
constitutional value that lawmakers need to protect. If lawmakers
17. 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
18. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
19. 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).
20. See Boudin, supra note 5, at 2149, 2179; cf. Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance
Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 276 (2010) (proposing increased disclosure thresholds in
order to combat the current ills of discouraged political participation, intrusion upon privacy
rights of individuals, and non-useful information).
21. Briffault, supra note 12, at 1003–04 (stating that because “[t]here is no obvious
constitutional standard for setting the balance between these privacy and publicity—and
anonymity and accountability—concerns,” different courts and laws may set the balance in
different places).
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apply the factors that this Article proposes and seek to find the zone
of constitutionality, then both sides of free speech can be
safeguarded.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to understand the current state of the disclosure
doctrine, it is necessary to look at how Congress and the Court have
interpreted the evolving doctrine over the years.22 The following
section provides an overview of the judicial and legislative history of
disclosure in campaign finance.
A. Judicial and Legislative History of the Disclosure Doctrine:
An Evolving Record
The concept of disclosure in campaign finance is hardly novel in
the United States.23 In fact, Congress and the judiciary have reflected
on the role of disclosure in campaign finance for much of the last
century.24 However, the disclosure doctrine in election financing is
still developing; throughout the years, the Court has not consistently
held in favor of either disclosure or privacy.25
In 1925, Congress amended the Federal Corrupt Practices Act,
originally enacted in 1910.26 This act, as amended, paid particular
attention to “political committees” that accepted contributions “for
the purpose of influencing or attempting to influence the election of
presidential and vice presidential electors in two or more states.”27 A
treasurer from each of these committees was required to submit to
the clerk of the House of Representatives a list of the committee’s
contributors, including the contributor’s name and address, as well as
the date and amount of the contribution.28 This act came on the tails

22. See, e.g., id. at 988–99.
23. See generally Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 241–45 (1925) (established
campaign spending limits); Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934) (upheld the
disclosure requirements of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act).
24. See Federal Corrupt Practices Act §§ 241–45; Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 544–48.
25. Compare Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 548 (upholding disclosure requirements), with
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (upholding privacy interests), and
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 115–16 (2003) (acknowledging the privacy interest), overruled
by Citizens United v. FEC, 120 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
26. 2 U.S.C. §§ 241–45.
27. Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 541.
28. Id.
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of the Tillman Act, which completely banned corporate monetary
contributions in connection with a federal election.29
Despite the passage of these two acts, the Court did not consider
disclosure in the campaign finance realm until 1934.30 In Burroughs
v. United States, the Court held in favor of disclosure, finding that
“Congress [had] reached the conclusion that public disclosure of
political contributions, together with the names of contributors and
other details, would tend to prevent the corrupt use of money to
affect elections.”31 The Federal Corrupt Practices Act was a way for
Congress to protect the United States’ republican government from
corrupt elections without banning corporate contributions outright as
the Tillman Act had done.32
For several decades, no notable legislative or judicial changes
took place, and the law seemed firmly rooted in the doctrine of
mandatory disclosure.33 However, by mid-century, the country’s
support for disclosure began to waver.34 In 1958, the Supreme Court
decided the seminal case of NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.35
It was decided against the backdrop of the Civil Rights Movement36:
it was filed in 1956, which was the same year that the Montgomery
bus boycott took place and the same year that an Alabama district
court declared racial segregation of public buses to be
unconstitutional.37 The question at issue in Patterson was whether
the Alabama State Attorney General could compel the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to
reveal the names and addresses of its members who reside in

29. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 115 (citing Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (codified
as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (2012))).
30. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 116; Briffault, supra note 12, at 988.
31. Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 548.
32. Id. at 547; Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (current version at 52 U.S.C.
§ 30118 (2012)).
33. Twenty-four years passed between the Court’s decision in Burroughs and the Court’s
decision in Patterson. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Burroughs,
290 U.S. at 534.
34. See, e.g., Patterson, 357 U.S. at 449; Briffault, supra note 20, at 279 (“A series of cases
in the late 1950s and early 1960s demonstrate[ed] the threat [that] government-mandated
disclosure could pose to unpopular political organizations . . . .”).
35. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
36. Ho, supra note 14, at 409.
37. Id. at 409; Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956), aff’d sub nom. Owen
v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
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Alabama.38 Justice Harlan, who wrote the opinion of the behalf of
the majority, held that requiring the NAACP to produce the records
was a denial of due process because it “entail[ed] the likelihood of a
substantial restraint upon the exercise by petitioner's members of
their right to freedom of association.”39
In arriving at its decision, the Court addressed petitioners’ claim
that compelled disclosure infringed upon a fundamental freedom of
association that was protected by the due process clause of the 14th
amendment.40 In persuasive dicta, Justice Harlan reasserted the
constitutional principle that a fundamental right cannot be infringed
upon without a valid state interest: “It contends that governmental
action which, although not directly suppressing association,
nevertheless carries this consequence, can be justified only upon
some overriding valid interest of the State.”41 Moreover, the Court
wrote, in dicta, that privacy of association was necessary to preserve
the fundamental right to freedom of association.42 The Court wrote:
“Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many
circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of
association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”43
Finally, Justice Harlan discussed the connection between the right to
freedom of association and the right to freedom of speech to
effective advocacy: “It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable
aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”44
The Court ultimately found that disclosure of the NAACP’s
membership roster would have the adverse effect of inhibiting the
ability of the NAACP “to pursue their collective effort to foster
beliefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate, in that it
may induce members to withdraw from the Association and dissuade
others from joining it because of fear of exposure of their beliefs

38. Ho, supra note 14, at 451 (“Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many
circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a
group espouses dissident beliefs.”).
39. Id. at 462.
40. Id. at 460.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 462.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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shown through their associations and of the consequences of this
exposure.”45
Patterson became the first significant step away from mandated
disclosure by demonstrating that disclosure could have the negative
effect of threatening politically vulnerable groups in a way that
would hinder their political activity.46 However, only a decade and
half later, Congress undermined the significance of Patterson and
took a step back toward disclosure when it enacted the Federal
Elections Campaign Act47 (FECA) in 1971. This act limited political
contributions and media broadcasts to candidates for federal elective
office by individuals, groups, and political committees.48 More
importantly, it required political committees to keep detailed records
of most contributions and expenditures49 and to file quarterly reports
with the Federal Elections Commission disclosing the source of
every expenditure over one hundred dollars.50
The Court followed suit, by deciding in favor of disclosure in
Buckley v. Valeo in 1976.51 In this seminal case, the Supreme Court
assessed the constitutionality of several sections of the
recently-enacted FECA, as well as some sections of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954.52 The appellants, a group of politicians
running for political office, argued that political contributions and
expenditures “are at the very core of political speech, and that the
Act's limitations thus constitute restraints on First Amendment
liberty that are both gross and direct.”53
The FECA sections at issue concerned the following:
(a) individual political contributions were limited to $1,000 to any

45. Id. at 463.
46. Briffault, supra note 12, at 988.
47. Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 431 (1971) (amended 1974)
(transferred to 52 U.S.C. § 30101 (2012)).
48. Id.
49. The Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971 “requires political committees to keep
detailed records of contributions and expenditures, including the names and address of each
individual contributing in excess of $100, and his occupation and principal place of business if his
contribution exceeds $100 . . . and also requires every individual or group, other than a candidate
or political committee, making contributions or expenditures exceeding $100 to file a statement
with the Commission.” 2 U.S.C. § 431(c) (1971) (transferred to 52 U.S.C. § 30101 (2012)).
50. Id.
51. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). This case came to the Supreme Court as a
constitutional challenge to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.
52. Id. at 6.
53. Id. at 15.
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single candidate per election, with an overall annual limitation of
$25,000 by any contributor; (b) contributions and expenditures above
certain threshold levels were required to be reported and publicly
disclosed; (c) a system for public funding of presidential campaign
activities was established by Subtitle H of the Internal Revenue
Code; and (d) a Federal Election Commission was established to
administer and enforce the legislation.54
The primary issue in this case was whether these provisions
violated the First Amendment because, as the Court wrote in dicta,
“discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of
candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government
established by our Constitution.”55 The Court was more concerned
with FECA’s expenditure limitations than its contribution limitations
because they “necessarily reduce[] the quantity of expression by
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their
exploration, and the size of the audience reached.”56 The Court
considered this to be a “substantial” restraint on the quality and
quantity of political speech.57
To determine whether FECA’s disclosure requirements violated
the First Amendment, the Court applied “exacting scrutiny.”58
“Exacting scrutiny” requires a “relevant correlation” or a “substantial
relation” between the governmental interest and the information to
be disclosed as required by the law.59
The Court addressed each regulation separately. For the $1,000
contribution limit to candidates, the Court upheld the restriction
because it found that the corruption interest was strong enough,
under a heightened scrutiny, to justify an intrusion onto First
Amendment rights.60 The Court also upheld the $5,000 contribution
limit by political committees and the $25,000 annual contribution
limitation on similar reasoning.61
54. Id. at 7.
55. Id. at 14.
56. Id. at 19.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 64 (“[S]ignificant encroachments on First Amendment rights of the sort that
compelled disclosure imposes cannot be justified by a mere showing of some legitimate
governmental interest.”).
59. Id. (citing Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 544 (1963);
Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960)).
60. Id. at 29.
61. Id. at 35.
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However, the Court’s holdings for campaign expenditures fell
opposite to its contributions holding because, as the Court wrote in
dicta in the prelude to its holdings: “It is clear that a primary effect of
these expenditure limitations is to restrict the quantity of campaign
speech by individuals, groups, and candidates.”62 Ultimately, the
Court held that the corruption interest was inadequate to justify a
limitation on independent expenditures:63 “While the independent
expenditure ceiling thus fails to serve any substantial governmental
interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in the
electoral process, it heavily burdens core First Amendment
expression.”64 The Court additionally held that FECA’s restriction on
a candidate's personal expenditures was unconstitutional.65 Finally,
the Court held that the overall contribution limitations were
unconstitutional because it found that no sufficient governmental
interest had been asserted to justify the First Amendment intrusion.66
Thus, in sum, the Court in Buckley upheld as Constitutional FECA’s
restrictions on campaign contributions due to corruption concerns,
however, it found FECA’s expenditure limitations to be
unconstitutional due to their substantial intrusion on First
Amendment expression.67
Following Buckley, the Court’s holding remained the status quo
for political speech for more than twenty years until the Court
decided McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission in 1994.68 The issue
in McIntyre was whether an Ohio law that prohibited the distribution
of anonymous campaign literature violated the First Amendment.69
In April 1988, Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets at a public
meeting in Ohio expressing her personal opposition to a proposed
local school tax levy.70 She signed some of the leaflets with the
phrase “Concerned Parents and Tax Payers” and others with her
name.71 The Ohio Elections Commission fined McIntyre $100 for
violating a state statute that prohibited persons from distributing
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 39.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 55–58.
Id. at 58–59.
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
Id. at 336.
Id. at 337.
Id.
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campaign literature without including the name and address of the
sponsor.72
The Court applied “exacting scrutiny” because the Ohio law
burdened “core political speech,” and which it defined as requiring
the restriction to be narrowly tailored to an overriding state interest.73
While assessing the Ohio law, the Court compared the law to the
restrictions in Buckley and found the McIntyre disclosure
requirement to be more intrusive than the Buckley requirements.74
Ultimately, the Court held that the Ohio law was unconstitutional
under the First Amendment because it could not find a sufficient
interest to justify the intrusion on the free speech.75 In dicta, offered
as explanation, the Court wrote that the purpose of the First
Amendment was to protect the proponents of unpopular views from
retaliation.76 “The right to remain anonymous,” it held, “may be
abused when it shields fraudulent conduct, but political speech by its
nature will sometimes have unpalatable consequences, and, in
general, our society accords greater weight to the value of free
speech than to the dangers of its misuse.”77
Finally, just three years after McIntyre, the Court concluded the
twentieth century with a decision leaning back in favor of
disclosure.78 In Federal Elections Commission v. Akins,79 the Court
again examined FECA, this time to address the record-keeping and
disclosure requirements that the act imposed upon political
committees to combat corruption.80 If a group fell within the Federal
Elections Commission’s (FEC) definition of a “political committee,”
then FECA required the group to “register with the FEC, appoint a
treasurer, keep names and addresses of contributors, track the
amount and purpose of disbursements, and file complex FEC
reports” on “contributions, expenditures, and any other
72. Id. at 338.
73. Id. at 347.
74. Id. at 356.
75. Id. at 357.
76. Id.
77. Id. (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630–31 (1919)). Additionally, the
Court noted, “Don’t underestimate the common man. People are intelligent enough to evaluate
the source of an anonymous writing . . . . And then, once they have done so, it is for them to
decide what is ‘responsible’, what is valuable, and what is truth.” Id. at 348 n.11 (quoting New
York v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 996 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974)).
78. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 26 (1998).
79. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
80. Id. at 14.
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disbursements.”81 According to FECA, a “political committee”
“includes ‘any committee, club, association or other group of persons
which receives’ more than $1,000 in ‘contributions’ or ‘which
makes’ more than $1,000 in ‘expenditures’ in any given year.”82
The case arose after a group of voters petitioned the FEC to treat
the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) as a political
committee because the group’s expenditures exceeded $1,000 per
year.83 The FEC decided not to proceed against AIPAC as a political
committee because it felt that FECA’s definition of “political
committees” includes “only those organizations that have as a ‘major
purpose’ the nomination or election of candidates.”84 The FEC
believed that AIPAC was an issue-oriented lobbying organization,
rather than a campaign organization, and thus concluded that that it
was not a “political committee” under FECA.85 The voters filed a
petition in the U.S. District Court seeking review of the FEC’s
determination.86
The relevant issue that the Court addressed was whether an
organization that otherwise satisfied FECA’s definition of a
“political committee” could be excluded from the act’s disclosure
requirements because “‘its major purpose’ is not ‘the nomination or
election of candidates.’”87 The Court, in dicta, was concerned that
the FEC’s application of this definition had the effect of “narrowing”
the definition of a “political committee,” which could affect First
Amendment rights.88 The Court expressed strong concern over the
narrowing of the definition of “political committee” that would allow
groups to evade the record-keeping and disclosure requirements of
the Act.89 In fact, in a prior discussion on the issue of standing, the
Court held that voters’ inability to obtain information—lists of
AIPAC donors, donations, and contributions—constituted an “injury
in fact,” which gave them standing to challenge the FEC.90 By
finding this “injury in fact,” the Court acknowledged the importance
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 28–29.
Id. at 21.
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and necessity of disclosure and disseminating information to
voters.91
The Court remanded the case to allow the FEC to develop a new
definition and to determine whether “AIPAC’s expenditures qualify
as ‘membership communications,’ and thereby fall outside the scope
of ‘expenditures’ that could qualify it as a ‘political committee.’”92
The twentieth century concluded without a clear answer on
whether, in the context of campaign finance, the disclosure interest
or the privacy interest was more important. As implemented, FECA
preferred the disclosure of donators, contributors, and contributions.
However, the Supreme Court’s parallel decisions throughout the
century wavered between a clear preference for disclosure and a
clear preference for privacy. The Court’s opinions expressed a fear
of corruption that was balanced against recognition of the importance
of confidentiality, but the Court’s holdings did not provide a method
for how to reconcile these two interests.
B. Current State of the Disclosure Doctrine
The early part of the twenty-first century has, thus far, seen
several major Supreme Court decisions on campaign finance
disclosure.93 Some of the first major cases of the twenty-first century
came about as a result of another Congressional attempt to reform
campaign finance: the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA), which amended FECA. Two seminal cases—McConnell v.
Federal Elections Commission94 and Citizens United v. Federal
Elections Commission95—addressed challenges to the BCRA’s
provisions.96
The BCRA was passed amid public concern of political
corruption.97 The major subjects addressed by the BCRA are: soft
money; electioneering communications (issue ads); coordinated and
91. See id. at 20–21 (explaining that information would help voters evaluate political
candidates and decide who to vote for and financially support).
92. Id. at 29.
93. See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010); Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
94. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
95. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
96. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 101, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
97. Paul S. Herrnson, The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act and Congressional Elections, in
CAMPAIGN WARRIORS: POLITICAL CONSULTANTS IN ELECTIONS 107, 113–14 (James A. Thurber
& Candice J. Nelson eds., 2000), available at http://web.mit.edu/~17.261/www/herrnson.pdf.
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independent expenditures; contribution limitations and prohibitions,
disclaimers; personal use of campaign funds; and millionaire
candidates.98 The purpose of the act was “to ensure that campaign
advertisements are subject to disclosure . . . [and] to ensure that
meaningful rules governing ‘coordination’ between an outside
spender and an a [sic] candidate are in place to prevent evasion of the
contribution limits, disclosure requirements and source prohibitions
of federal law.”99 In general, the act served to end the use of “soft
money,” restrict corporate and union contributions to electioneering
communications, require donor disclosures of electioneering
communications costing more than $10,000, increase campaign
contribution limits for individuals and some political committees,
and require disclaimers on any communication by a political
committee.100
The soft money restrictions and increased hard money
limitations of the act created a heated political dynamic in Congress,
and opponents of the act were preparing to challenge it while it was
still being debated in the Senate.101 Senator McConnell, a Republican
from Kentucky, was active in the filibuster against the bill and swore
that he would be the lead plaintiff in a lawsuit to invalidate the bill if
it became a law.102 Shortly after President Bush signed the BCRA
into law, McConnell filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia against the FEC, claiming that the BCRA
violated the First Amendment and the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Equal Protection Clause.103
Ultimately, the case, a consolidation of more than eighty claims,
made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court as McConnell v. Federal
Elections Commission,104 where the Court upheld some portions of
the BCRA and found other portions to be unconstitutional. In a
98. 36 U.S.C. § 510 (2012); 52 U.S.C. §§ 30111, 30117, 30125, 30126 (2012).
99. Id. (quoting Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at
2, Shays v. FEC, 340 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D.D.C. 2002) (No. 02-1984).
100. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 166 Stat. 81 (current
version at 52 U.S.C. § 30101 (2012)).
101. See Herrnsen, supra note 97, at 121.
102. Id.
103. L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CAMPAIGN FINANCE: BRIEF OVERVIEW OF
MCCONNELL V. FEC 1 (May 19, 2003), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/
22686.pdf.
104. 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003); Torres-Spelliscy, Has the Tide Turned in Favor of Disclosure?
Revealing Money in Politics After Citizens United, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1057, 1061 (2010).
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five to four decision, the Court upheld most of the major
provisions of the BCRA, as well as finding the plaintiffs lacked
standing to challenge the Millionaire Provisions,105 mandatory
electioneering-communications-disbursements
disclosure
was
106
constitutional, prohibition of individual contributions by minors
was unconstitutional,107 and candidate request requirements were
constitutional.108
The largest part of the Court’s opinion focused on Titles I and II
of the BCRA. First, the Court assessed the constitutionality of Title I,
which regulates and restricts the use of soft money.109 “Soft money”
refers to contributions by individuals, corporations, or labor unions
to a political candidate, or committee, that are not restricted by
federal contribution limitations110 and are made solely for the
purpose influencing election for federal office.111 Soft money
donations are primarily distinguished from hard money donations
because hard money donations are those that have been made subject
to FECA’s disclosure requirements.112 However, prior to the
enactment of BCRA, contributors could avoid FECA’s restrictions
by donating to “non-federal” campaigns, such as to a political party
for its state and local activities.113
BCRA Title I sought to restrict soft money because contributors
who had already made hard money contributions to the FECA limit
were using soft money as way to continue contributing to political
105. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 107.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 108.
108. Id. at 109.
109. Id. at 132. Specifically, “[a] national committee of a political party (including a national
congressional campaign committee of a political party) may not solicit, receive, or direct to
another person a contribution, donation, or transfer of funds or any other thing of value, or spend
any funds, that are not subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this
Act.” Id. at 342 (quoting 2 U.S.C.A. § 441i(a)(1) (West 2002), invalidated by McConnell v. FEC,
540 U.S. 93 (2003)).
110. W. Parker Baxter, Recent Development, Recent Developments in Campaign Finance
Law: Implementing the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 589, 592 (2003). This money is largely unregulated and has been used for campaign
advertisements that support or criticize a political candidate. Id. at 592–93.
111. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122. The soft money disclosure loophole comes from FECA,
which defined the term “contribution” to only money that was donated “for the purpose of
influencing any election for Federal office.” Justin S. Teff, The Need for Campaign Finance
Reform in New York, N.Y. ST. B.A. J., March/April 2007, at 37 (quoting 2 U.S.C.A. §
431(8)(A)(i) (West 2002)) (emphasis added).
112. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122.
113. Teff, supra note 111, at 37.
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parties beyond that maximum amount.114 Following FECA, soft
money contributions were used extensively and these contributions
were frequently larger than hard money contributions.115 From 1984
to 2002, soft money contribution increased from accounting for just
5 percent of major party spending to 42 percent.116 This money was
typically raised using the fundraising expertise of a national political
party, and was then distributed to state campaigns with specific and
detailed instructions on how to spend the money.117 The state
campaigns would launch campaigns that were coordinated with the
federal campaigns in a manner that would bolster the federal
campaign without coming directly from the federal campaign.118
Through this soft money loop hole, federal candidates even went so
far as to direct would-be contributors to donate to specific state and
local political committees.119 According to the Court in McConnell,
such contributions were “not uncommon.”120 As a result, BCRA
Title I closed the soft money loophole by adding Section 323(a) to
FECA, which prohibits national political party committees and their
agents from accepting soft money.121
In assessing the constitutionality of Title I, the Court applied
“the less rigorous scrutiny applicable to contribution limits to
evaluate the constitutionality of new FECA § 323” because the Court
found that restricting campaign contributions only marginally limits
the contributor’s ability to engage in free speech.122 The Court found
that there was a government interest at play because there was
“substantial evidence to support Congress’ determination that large
soft-money contributions to national political parties give rise to
corruption and the appearance of corruption.”123 Then, by weighing
the governmental interest of avoiding corruption, or the appearance
of corruption, against section 323(a), the Court upheld section 323(a)
because this interest was “sufficient to justify subjecting all
114. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122.
115. Id. at 123, 133. Hard money is campaign contributions that are subject to a $5,000
donation limit. Nick Hoffman, Case Notes: Emily’s List v. FEC, 42 URB. LAW. 210 (2010).
116. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 124.
117. See Herrnsen, supra note 97, at 112.
118. Id.
119. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 125.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 133.
122. Id. at 133–35, 141.
123. Id. at 143–53.
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donations to national parties to the source, amount, and disclosure
limitations of FECA.”124 The Court’s decision ultimately deferred to
Congress and allowed Congress to regulate contributions through
source restrictions and disclosure requirements.125
The era from 2007, when McConnell was decided, to 2010 is
known by some as the “dark days for disclosure.”126 During this
time, a “jurisprudential battle [was] raging in the courts,”127 and
opponents of campaign finance laws and disclosure laws were
challenging the Court’s definition of “political action committee[s]”
and “election ad[s].”128 The reason for this was that many states only
mandated campaign finance reporting for organizations that were
classified as political action committees.129 One of the strongest
attacks on disclosure was that the state could only “require disclosure
of ads that were the functional [equivalent] of express advocacy.”130
Nonetheless, these “dark days” for disclosure would end by 2010,131
at least for the time being, when the Supreme Court decided two
seminal cases, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission132
and Doe v. Reed.133
In 2008, Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation,134 produced a
documentary entitled Hillary: The Movie that was critical of Senator
Hillary Clinton, who was then a primary candidate for President.135
After releasing the documentary in theaters and on DVD, Citizens
United sought to increase distribution of the film by making it
available through video-on-demand.136 To promote the film, as well
124. Id. at 156.
125. Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 104, at 1063.
126. Id. at 1060.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1062.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1064–65 (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449, 465
(2007)).
131. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (upholding disclosure requirements).
132. Id.
133. 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).
134. Non-profit organizations structure themselves as 501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4) corporations to
gain a tax advantage because the Internal Revenue Code exempts such organizations from federal
taxes. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 501 (West 2012). Courts in the past have found that non-profits such as
these are exempt from disclosure regulations because the corporate form matters. Richard
Briffault, Nonprofits and Disclosure in the Wake of Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 337, 341
(2011). Citizens United’s non-profit status is important because corporations often funnel
campaign contributions through non-profit intermediaries. Briffault, supra note 12, at 985.
135. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886–87.
136. Id. at 887.
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as fundraise for its distribution, Citizens United produced
advertisements about Senator Clinton to run on broadcast and cable
television.137 The advertisements concluded with the name of the
documentary and the website address for the film.138 Citizens United
wished to make the documentary available on video-on-demand up
to, and through, thirty days prior to the 2008 Presidential election.139
At the time, 2 U.S.C. § 441b prohibited corporations from using
general treasury funds to make direct contributions to candidates or
independent expenditures that expressly advocate the election or
defeat of a candidate, through any form of media, in connection with
certain qualified federal elections.140 Additionally, the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act, which was upheld in McConnell, modified
§ 441b to prohibit “electioneering communications,” which it
defined as “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication” that
“refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office” and is
made within thirty days of a primary or sixty days of a general
election.141
Concerned that Hillary and its accompanying ads would violate
the prohibition on independent expenditures and electioneering
communications, Citizens United sought declaratory and injunctive
relief against the FEC to enjoin enforcement of § 441b on the
grounds of unconstitutionality.142
Ultimately, the case made its way to the Supreme Court where
the Court was asked to revisit McConnell and § 441b.143 After
declining to decide the case on narrow grounds particular to Citizens
United and Hillary, the Court determined whether § 441b violated
the First Amendment’s free speech provisions.144 Upfront, the Court

137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 888.
140. Id. at 887.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 887–88. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act section 203 amended section 441b
to prohibit “electioneering communication.” Id. “Electioneering communication is defined as
‘any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication’ that ‘refers to a clearly identified candidate for
Federal office’ and is made within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election.” Id.
(quoting § 434(f)(3)(A)). The FEC regulations further define it as a communication that is
“publicly distributed.” Id. (quoting 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(a)(2) (2009)).
143. Id. at 886.
144. Id. at 891–92.
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found the § 441b was a clear prohibition on corporate speech.145 The
Court quoted the opinion in Buckley v. Valeo to explain its reasoning:
“As a ‘restriction on the amount of money a person or group can
spend on political communication during a campaign,” that statute
“necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the
number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the
size of the audience reached.’”146 The Court continued, “If § 441b
applied to individuals, no one would believe that it is merely a time,
place, or manner restriction on speech. Its purpose and effect are to
silence entities whose voices the Government deems to be
suspect.”147
Significantly, the opinion disregards the primary argument in
Buckley, which was that restrictions were needed to avoid corruption
or the appearance of corruption: “The fact that speakers may have
influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that these
officials are corrupt”; and “The appearance of influence or access,
furthermore, will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our
democracy.”148
Ultimately, in a five-four decision, the Court overruled
McConnell’s upholding of § 441b’s individual expenditure
restrictions: “No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on
the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”149
However, the Court did uphold the disclosure and disclaimer
requirements of the BCRA as constitutional.150 Five years after this
holding, Citizens United is viewed as a controversial decision where
the Court’s stated desire for transparency and disclosure was
contradicted with a loophole where individuals and corporations may
make unlimited political contributions that undermine the goals of
disclosure.151

145. Id. at 897 (“Section 441b is a ban on corporate speech notwithstanding the fact that a
PAC created by a corporation can still speak.”).
146. Id. at 898 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976)).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 910.
149. Id. at 913.
150. Id. at 916.
151. Gabrielle Levy, How Citizens United Has Changed Politics in 5 Years, U.S. NEWS AND
WORLD REPORT (Jan. 21, 2015, 12:26 PM EST), available at http://www.usnews.com/news/
articles/2015/01/21/5-years-later-citizens-united-has-remade-us-politics.
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However, at least on paper, the Court continued to support
disclosure in Doe v. Reed, another influential 2010 decision.152 In
May 2009, the State of Washington had extended certain state
benefits to registered same-sex couples by signing into law SB
5688.153 In response, a state political committee collected over
137,000 petition signatures and submitted them to the Washington
Secretary of State, pursuant to the state referendum requirements, to
place a referendum on the ballot to allow the voters to vote on SB
5688, with the goal of encouraging voters to reject the bill.154 When
the referendum appeared on the November 2009 ballot, the voters
ratified the benefits law by a narrow margin.155
The case arose when the political committee that launched the
referendum, Protect Marriage Washington, sought to enjoin the
Secretary of State from publicly releasing documents with names and
addresses of those who signed the petition.156 Beginning in August
prior to the election, the Secretary of State had received requests for
copies of the petition from several organizations, such as Washington
Coalition for Open Government and Washington Families Standing
Together.157 The requests were made pursuant to a Washington State
public records act, under which Washington State considers petitions
to be “public records.”158 Protect Marriage Washington claimed that
releasing the petition records would violate the First Amendment
privacy rights of the petition signers.159
The Court, using exacting scrutiny, held that disclosure under
the public records act would not violate the First Amendment with
respect to referendum petitions because the disclosure was
“sufficiently related” to protecting the integrity of the elections
process.160 By The Court found that public disclosure of petition
signatures promoted transparency and accountability, in addition to
combating fraud, by ensuring that only valid signatures that should
152. See Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).
153. Id. at 2815–16 (describing SB 5688).
154. Id. (stating that about 120,000 valid signatures were required to place the referendum on
the ballot and the Washington Secretary of State determined that the petition contained enough
valid signatures to place the referendum on the ballot).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 2816.
157. Id.
158. Id.; Public Records Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56 (2006).
159. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2816–17.
160. Id. at 2818–21.
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be counted were counted.161 Additionally, the Court found that there
was insufficient evidence that compelled disclosure would expose
the signatories to “threats, harassment, or reprisals.”162 Therefore, the
Court upheld the petition disclosure under the public records act as
Constitutional.163
From 2010–2015, there was little jurisprudence in the way of
disclosure and privacy in campaign finance. However, action in the
lower courts may be signaling that change is coming. In July 2015,
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
decided a case involving Citizens United, the same political
committee that was the nameplate of the 2010 seminal case.164
In Citizens United v. Schneiderman, Citizens United sought to
preliminarily enjoin the New York Attorney General from enforcing
his policy of requiring registered charities to disclose the names,
addresses, and total contributions of their major donors to solicit
funds in the state.165 They argue that this disclosure violates their
First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and association.166
Using exacting scrutiny, as the Supreme Court has used in
previous campaign finance disclosure cases, the court found that
there is a sufficiently important governmental interest in overseeing
charitable organizations and enforcing solicitation laws, and that the
Attorney General’s policy is substantially related to that interest.167
Additionally, the court held that this governmental interest is strong
enough to justify a minimal burden on the First Amendment rights of
the charities’ donors.168 The court also addressed other tangential
issues, however the court ultimately held that Citizens United was
not entitled to a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Attorney
General from obtaining donor names and addresses from charities.169
The Court’s variable decisions over time have left a state of
uncertainty because lower courts and legislators do not know how or
what the Supreme Court will decide next in the campaign finance
161. Id. at 2819.
162. Id. at 2820–21.
163. Id. at 2821.
164. Citizens United et al v. Schneiderman, No. 14-cv-3703, 2015 WL 4509717 (S.D.N.Y.
July 27, 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-2718 (2d Cir. Aug. 24, 2015).
165. Id. at *1.
166. Id.
167. Id. at *4–5.
168. Id. at *6.
169. Id. at *13.
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arena.170 Although the current law seemingly favors the interests of
disclosure over the interests of privacy, the Court has not created a
consistent test that can be used to balance these constitutional
issues.171 It remains to be seen if the Court will choose a firm
balancing point, or if the pendulum will continue to waver back and
forth. Although the courts are not currently addressing these issues
directly, lower court decisions in favor of disclosure in the face of
the First Amendment may indicate that more decisions are to come.
C. Constitutional Issues Implicated in Campaign Finance
The Court has grounded many of its campaign finance
disclosure cases in the constitutional interests underlying the First
Amendment’s right to free speech.172 Specifically, the Court relied
upon two interests under the First Amendment: the informational
interest and the anonymity interest.173 The informational interest says
that free speech and an uninhibited flow of information and ideas
will lead to informed voters and create an open, inviting, and
effective democratic process.174 In contrast, the anonymity interest
says that a speaker’s identity should be kept anonymous to prevent
speech from being “chilled” and the speaker silenced for fear of
retaliation.175 Within the context of campaign finance disclosure
regulations, these two interests are oppositional because voters
cannot have full access to donor information at the same time that

170. See, e.g., Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 217, 222–23 (2010) (explaining that there are questions left unanswered and much is
unclear following Citizens United).
171. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 12, at 1004 (“There is no obvious standard for deciding
what the disclosure threshold ought to be.”).
172. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 105 (2003) (upholding BCRA’s disclosure
requirements based on the voters’ informational interest); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 81
(1976) (relying on the informational interest to justify disclosure requirements); cf. Doe v. Reed,
130 S. Ct. 2811, 2824–25 (2010) (dismissing the privacy interest and relying on the informational
interest); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (relying on the privacy
interest).
173. Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2824; McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357.
174. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 867, 914 (2010); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66 (explaining
that disclosure can be justified on the basis of the governmental interest in providing information
to the electorate).
175. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341–42; William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre’s Persona: Bringing
Privacy Theory to Election Law, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 859, 859 (citing McIntyre, 514
U.S. at 341–42) (stating that the anonymity interest may be motivated by fear of economic or
official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much
of one’s privacy as possible).
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donor identification is kept confidential.176 However, the application
of these two interests and the constitutional bases for campaign
finance disclosure is underdeveloped.177
The following section lays out the two primary constitutional
interests that encompass disclosure laws: the informational interest
and the anonymity interest.
1. The Informational Interest
It is generally recognized that the main reason for campaign
finance disclosure is having an informed electorate.178 By informing
voters about sources of funding and other support for candidates or
ballot propositions, disclosure “improves the ability of voters to
evaluate candidates.”179 This disclosure ultimately furthers the First
Amendment interest of free speech because voting (especially for
legislators) and other political activity, such as signing a petition, is a
form of political speech.180 As the Court in Citizens United noted,
“[t]he First Amendment protects political speech[,] and disclosure
permits citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate
entities in a proper way.”181 Time and time again, the Court has used
the informational interest as its primary basis for finding disclosure
requirements constitutional.182
Buckley was the first case to really establish the purpose and
importance of the informational interest.183 Early in the opinion, in a
section entitled “General Principles,” the Court’s discussion on
FECA’s restrictions explained that the restrictions implicated “an
area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities.”184 The
Court stated that public discussion of issues is integral to our
176. See, e.g., Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2824–25 (explaining the implications of both constitutional
interests and stating that the informational interest runs “headfirst” into a half-century of case law
saying that individuals have a right to privacy); Anthony Johnstone, A Madisonian Case for
Disclosure, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 413, 430 (2012) (explaining that anonymity is the original
doctrinal principle opposed to disclosure).
177. Johnstone, supra note 176, at 414.
178. Briffault, supra note 12, at 990.
179. Id.
180. Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2830 (voting serves an “expressive purpose”); Nev. Comm’n on
Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2011); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272
(1971) (stating the politically-motivated speech is highly protected by the First Amendment).
181. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010).
182. See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915–17; McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 105
(2003); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 81 (1976).
183. Johnstone, supra note 176, at 434.
184. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 (emphasis added).
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governmental system, and protected by the First Amendment
specifically to assure an exchange of ideas that may bring about
changes people desire.185 The Court reasoned that the purpose of this
interest was to create a society where uninhibited public debate
would thrive, and that without this, the United States would not have
a healthy democracy.186
More than thirty years later, the Court in Citizens United also
principally based its decision on the informational interest.187 This
interest, which it defined as “‘provid[ing] the electorate with
information’ . . . and ‘insur[ing] that the voters are fully informed’
about the person or group who is speaking,” became the centerpiece
of its holding.188 Some scholars predict that even more than being the
linchpin of its own holding, Citizens United’s reliance on the
informational interest will make this interest do most of the work to
justify disclosure laws189 looking forward.190
Similarly, the information interest, by way of an informed
electorate, was central to the Court’s holding in Doe v. Reed.191 In
Doe, the Court held that disclosing the identities of the referendum
petition signers protected the informational interest because this
information would inform voters about which interest groups were
supporting the referendum.192 Utilizing exacting scrutiny as it did in
Citizens United, the Court found a substantial relation between the
disclosure of information and the sufficiently important
governmental interest of preserving the integrity of the electoral
process.193 Thus, the Court firmly rooted disclosure as a
constitutionally protected interest.194

185. Id.
186. Johnstone, supra note 134, at 434 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 93).
187. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914 (stating that speech holds officials accountable to the
public and allows citizens to make informed choices).
188. Id. at 915 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 231 (2003) and Buckley, 424 U.S. at
76).
189. Although not the focus of this Article, courts and legislators have also justified
disclosure laws on the bases of preventing corruption, distortion, and the appearance of
corruption, among other reasons. See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 901–03; Austin v. Mich.
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
190. Johnstone, supra note 134, at 420.
191. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2824 (2010).
192. Steve Simpson, Doe v. Reed and the Future of Disclosure Requirements, 2010 CATO
SUP. CT. REV., 139, 150–51 (2009–2010).
193. Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2819.
194. Briffault, supra note 20, at 285.
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In conclusion, as the disclosure doctrine evolved across the
twentieth century through judicial decisions, the constitutional basis
that repeatedly and prominently arose was the informational
interest.195
2. The Anonymity Interest
The countervailing First Amendment interest is anonymity.196
Many of the Court’s twentieth-century decisions were rooted in this
interest.197 The anonymity interest is grounded in the idea that
individuals have the right to protect the privacy of their identities
because forced disclosure will inhibit political speech, due to fear of
threats or reprisals.198 Anonymity as a constitutional interest has a
long history in the United States, with its use dating back to the time
of the Constitution’s framers.199 Though their revolutionary
experiences were behind them, the Framers were well aware that
setting their names to controversial or inflammatory writings might
subject them to public ridicule or political retribution.200 Therefore,
many of the new republic’s earliest political pieces, like those that
had preceded them in the colonies, were written under
pseudonyms.201 Because of this, the framers viewed anonymity as an
important part of free speech.202 Though the First Amendment has
long been interpreted to protect anonymity in a variety of situations,
arguably the Court has never fully extended this blanket of protection
to speech in the electoral context.203
In the disclosure cases, the Court found several compelling
interests protected by the anonymity right.204 These include

195. See, e.g., Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2824 (Alito, J., concurring); Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at
914; McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 140 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S.
Ct. 876 (2010); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 81 (1976).
196. See Boudin, supra note 5, at 2147.
197. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341; NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466
(1958).
198. See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 462–63; Ho, supra note 14, at 413.
199. See Turley, supra note 12, at 61.
200. Id. at 58.
201. Id. at 59–60.
202. See id. at 61.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 75. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton,
536 U.S. 150, 166 (2002); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64–65 (1960).
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protection from persecution,205 preventing disenfranchisement,
encouraging pluralistic values and thoughts, protecting spontaneity,
enhancing privacy values, and protecting Internet speech.206 In the
case of campaign finance disclosure, there are two general aspects to
the anonymity interest: the first is that although disclosure does not
literally restrict speech, it does cause “chilling” of political speech,
especially in those who fear retaliation;207 the second is that
disclosure can discourage political activity when would-be
supporters are able to see who is financially supporting a certain
candidate.208
In the past, the Court’s holdings in other First Amendment cases
stood in favor of the anonymity interest by finding that privacy is
necessary in some circumstances to allow people to freely associate
and advocate.209 These holdings stand for the idea that compelled
disclosure can deter individual expression.210 A state’s compelled
disclosure laws do not directly restrain speech.211 Instead, such laws
only deter expressive conduct and thus fall within First Amendment
prohibitions.212 The Court explained that this privacy interest arises
from the potential harm that these laws have on speaker expression,
including the possibility of public scorn, “economic reprisal, loss of
employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of
public hostility.”213
However, this chilling effect is not limited to extreme acts of
violence and bigotry.214 “Courts and policymakers ignore reality if
they require blacklists or burning crosses before recognizing any
potential chilling effect.”215 For instance, citizens who want to avoid
confrontations with neighbors or friends may avoid political activity
205. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342, 357 (1995); see Turley, supra
note 12, at 75.
206. Turley, supra note 12, at 75–78.
207. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
208. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010) (describing McConnell v. FEC,
540 U.S. 93, 197 (2003), in which the Court held that some advertising groups were hiding
behind “dubious and misleading names” which indicated that disclosure helped voters make the
informed choice of whether to support a candidate after learning who the real advertiser is).
209. See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 462.
210. See Ho, supra note 14, at 413.
211. Id. at 412.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 413 (quoting Patterson, 357 U.S. at 464).
214. McGeveran, supra note 175, at 866–67.
215. Id. at 867.
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that will be disclosed.216 Disclosure may also have the effect of
simply inhibiting “honest communication and self-expression.”217
Additionally, the effect of disclosure on monetary contributions
may not have the same extreme chilling result as it does on political
speech.218 The Court in some cases has compared the level of
intrusion on a person’s anonymity with the likelihood that the
intrusion would chill political speech.219 It has concluded that
revealing the identity of a person who contributed money is less
intrusive than revealing the personality behind a political statement
because someone’s identity speaks more to the internal thoughts of
the person.220 For example, disclosure of someone’s expenditures
does not expose as much information as the handbill author’s identity
at issue in McIntyre because McIntyre’s handbill proposition was a
more personal expression than the simple donation of funds to a
candidate.221
In sum, the interest in anonymity has been supported at different
points in time and is recognized as a validly protected interest under
the First Amendment.
III. THREE PRIMARY PROBLEMS WITH THE COURT’S HOLDINGS
REGARDING COMPELLED DISCLOSURE
The Court’s long history of varied and inconsistent disclosure
doctrine holdings has left the doctrine in disarray.222 The various
decisions and holdings lack clear reconciliation and appear mainly
ad hoc.223 If the Court sees a principled balance between disclosure
and privacy interests, it has not clearly articulated what that balance
is. The Court in some cases has struck down laws in order to protect
anonymous speech and in other cases has allowed the anonymity
right to be curtailed.224 It has strongly upheld the anonymity right in
216. See id. at 877.
217. Id.
218. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 355 (1995).
219. See id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See supra Part II.
223. This is because the Court’s decisions in campaign finance disclosure cases changed back
and forth so drastically. See supra Part II. Additionally, the Court did not necessarily use the
same standard since the Court hesitated to define the level of scrutiny it used to analyze the
constitutionality of compelled disclosure on First Amendment rights. See Garrett, supra note 95,
at 238.
224. See supra Part II.
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a few cases, but only where threats of retaliation infringed upon the
freedom of association.225 As the previous discussion has illustrated,
the Court’s holdings over the past century have varied from
supporting disclosure, to supporting privacy, to supporting disclosure
again. These fluctuating holdings have resulted in three major
problems: (1) a lack of balance between the interests of disclosure
and the interests of privacy;226 (2) a lack of guidelines provided by
the Court on how to balance these interests;227 and (3) a lack of
clarity in the disclosure doctrine itself.228
Given these problems, citizens and corporations face continued
uncertainty unless the Court finally seeks a more rational posture
toward disclosure.229 Within the electoral realm, the United States
faces a future where important First Amendment rights are lost and
unprotected, the Court continues to issue inconsistent holdings, and
judges and lawmakers are left with laws that are difficult to
interpret.230 The following discussion further explains each of these
three problems and what they mean for the future of the disclosure
doctrine. Because of these defects in the disclosure doctrine, the
Court has much work ahead.
A. Lack of Balance
One current problem with the disclosure doctrine is the Court’s
failure to balance the competing interests of disclosure and
privacy.231 Both interests are important and need to be protected by
the Court, but by sacrificing the anonymity interest, as the Court has
225. See Turley, supra note 12, at 62 (discussing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449 (1958)).
226. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC 130 S. Ct. 876, 916–17 (2010) (concluding that the
informational interest was “sufficient to justify” the regulation at issue, without reaching the
anonymity interest); see also infra Part III.A.
227. See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916 (saying only that unrestricted political speech
should be paired with “effective disclosure,” without explaining what effective disclosure would
be); see infra Part III.C.
228. See also infra Part III.D.
229. Without clear guidelines, the legislature may pass acts that intrude on free speech more
than necessary, or more than the Court ever intended. See, e.g., DISCLOSE Act Stalls in Senate,
52 GOV’T CONTRACTOR, no. 29, Aug. 4, 2010, at 2 (quoting the ACLU, which commented that
the disclosure requirements of the Disclose Act were too narrow and should not justify the speech
restriction).
230. See infra Part III.C.
231. See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2821 (2010) (finding disclosure of individual
signers of referendum petitions constitutional without providing an exemption for individual
signers of controversial petitions who made a stronger case for anonymity).
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done in its recent holdings, the Court allows citizens to lose
everything this interest is meant to protect.232 The two most recent
seminal cases, Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, are illustrative
examples of the Court favoring the information interest over the
anonymity interest.233
1. A Lack of Balance Could Result in Completely
Diminished First Amendment Interests
In arriving at decisions like Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, the
Court did not attempt to balance the interests of disclosure with the
interests of privacy.234 Rather, it favored only one of these
interests.235 The result of the Court’s lack of balance is that the
privileges and security of the other interest are completely lost.236
The Court’s willingness to make a decision that disregards one
interest is extremely problematic because of the high constitutional
value of each interest.237 For example, anonymity, which was
recognized by the Court itself as being an important interest in
Patterson and McIntyre, can protect citizens from physical and
professional reprisals.238 Additionally, as discussed above, the right
of anonymity protects several other extremely compelling interests:
232. See DISCLOSE Act Stalls in Senate, supra note 229.
233. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).
234. See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Transparent Elections After Citizens United, BRENNAN CTR.
FOR JUSTICE AT N.Y.U. 11 (2011), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/a11b62a1ae58821838_z8
m6iiruw.pdf (“The logic of Citizens United and Doe v. Reed stand for similar principles—that
elections are special circumstances where a right to anonymous speech must generally give way
to governmental interests in the overall integrity of the democratic process of electing candidates
on the one hand, or putting a referendum to a public vote on the other.”).
235. Lately the Court has relied on the significance of the disclosure interest alone. For
example, the Court in Citizens United wrote: “The disclaimers required by § 311 ‘provid[e] the
electorate with information’ . . . and ‘insure that the voters are fully informed’ . . . . [T]he
informational interest alone is sufficient to justify application of § 201 to these ads.” Citizens
United, 130 S. Ct. at 915–16 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003), overruled by
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 76 (1976)). While it
briefly considered the privacy interests (although not in those terms), the Court did not appear
concerned about these interests and did not attempt to equilibrate or weigh them against the
favored interests of disclosure. Id. at 916.
236. See, e.g., Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2821 (holding that disclosure of the identity of individuals
who signed a petition was not unconstitutional and none of the signers were exempted from
disclosure).
237. The anonymity interest is especially at risk, and the state’s interest in preserving
anonymity is important because compelled disclosure can chill political speech to the point where
the disclosure intrudes upon freedom of speech. See Briffault, supra note 12, at 1003–05.
238. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 355 (1995); NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
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freedom from persecution, the sanctity of the voting franchise,
encouraging pluralistic values and thoughts, protecting spontaneity,
enhancing privacy values, and protecting Internet speech.239 The loss
of one of these constitutional rights could have the devastating effect
of chilling speech and causing a lack of political participation by
citizens.240
In Doe, the Court explicitly denied the right to the privacy of the
names and addresses of signatories.241 In addition, the Court
implicitly denied the right to be free from fear of retaliation,
harassment, and intimidation, either from government entities or
from private parties.242 While the Court made clear that
petition-signers would be protected from fear of great retaliation, it
did not ensure they would be protected from moderate or mild
retaliation that may result from a non-highly controversial
referendum petition.243 Had the Court balanced disclosure interests
and privacy interests, it may have found that privacy should be
preserved even when only mild retaliation could be expected.244 The
Court perhaps could have balanced the two interests by finding that
any person who could demonstrate a probability of harassment
would be excused from the disclosure requirements.245 Instead, the
Court protected disclosure interests at the expense of privacy
interests, thereby leaving individuals’ privacy interests almost
entirely unprotected.246 The Court’s high threshold for harassment

239. Turley, supra note 12, at 75–78.
240. Briffault, supra note 12, at 1003.
241. 130 S. Ct. at 2815, 2821.
242. Id. Under the Court’s examination, “modest burdens” are not sufficient to render
disclosure unconstitutional.
243. Id. at 2821 (stating essentially that the fear of reprisal is not high in typical referendum
petitions).
244. For example, as in the debate over the closed-circuit televising of the Proposition 8 trial
in the Northern District of California District Court, the Supreme Court concluded that irreparable
harm would come to the Plaintiff if their case was to be broadcast live on closed-circuit television
to other federal courthouses. In this case, the Court weighed and measured the relative harms and
benefits of the broadcast to the applicant and respondent. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 705,
712–13 (2010).
245. Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2821 (finding that there was not a “reasonable probability” of threats
and reprisals although petitioners cited examples of harassment and intimidation from similarly
controversial petitions in the region, and although the referendum signers’ names would be posted
in searchable form on the internet).
246. Id.
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and reprisal means that the anonymity interest can almost never
protect individuals from compelled disclosure.247
Of course, there will always be winners and losers in litigation.
In compelled disclosure cases, courts will have to decide whether a
disclosure law unconstitutionally intrudes on a right without a
sufficient state interest, and either anonymity or information will
lose.248 The Court’s most recent decisions choose disclosure at the
expense of anonymity.249 However, in some situations it may be
possible to favor disclosure while still protecting anonymity to a
certain degree.250
2. The Effect of the Level of Scrutiny
Arguably, the level of scrutiny may be to blame for the Court’s
lack of balance because a higher standard would require stronger
justification for a state’s interest in disclosure and in subverting
anonymity rights.251
The Court’s clear dismissal of the privacy interest in Citizens
United and Doe v. Reed has shown that the Court does not perform a
thorough balancing of these interests and does not always require a
sufficiently strong governmental interest to justify compelled
disclosure.252 Rather, the Court looks for any evidence that
disclosure will provide the public with information, even if such
evidence is scant, the informational need is questionable, or there are
good reasons to preserve anonymity. Having found some
justification for disclosure, the Court proceeds, heedless of the
consequences.253

247. Id.
248. In campaign finance cases, the Court has made clear that the information interest is a
sufficient state interest in at least some situations to justify compelled disclosure. See, e.g.,
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67–68 (1976) (per curiam); Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 234, at 8.
249. For example, in the case of independent expenditures, if disclosure thresholds are set at a
higher monetary value, then the anonymity of “small fish” will be protected while still advancing
the information interest of voters. See Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 234, at 13.
250. See id.
251. See, e.g., Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2820 (“Plaintiffs’ more significant objection is that ‘the
strength of the governmental interest’ does not ‘reflect the seriousness of the actual burden on
First Amendment rights.’” (quoting Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 744 (2008))).
252. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 917 (2010); Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2820–21.
253. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915–16 (finding that there was sufficient government
interest in providing information to voters and ignoring arguments that the disclosure
requirements were underinclusive would chill speech, and would not help voters make informed
choices); Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2820–21.
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A higher level of scrutiny would allow the Court to give
appropriate balance to the anonymity interest in the disclosure debate
rather than simply satisfying the scrutiny analysis with the
information interest alone.254 Strict scrutiny, requiring disclosure
regulations to be narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest,255
would force the Court to ensure that the information interest truly is
strong enough to justify sacrificing anonymity in each case, thereby
properly balancing the two interests.256
B. Lack of Guidelines
The second major problem facing the disclosure doctrine is the
Court’s failure to provide guidelines on how to interpret the meaning
and value of protected interests. By varying its holdings and
reasoning in disclosure doctrine cases over the past century, the
Court has left lawmakers and future lower court judges without firm
guidelines on how to assess the constitutionality of disclosure
requirements and how to balance disclosure and privacy interests in
any situation other than those in which the court has already
decided.257 For example, how should a lower court factor in whether
a speaker is an individual or a corporation? What if the organization
is a nonprofit?258 Does it matter if the person is signing a petition
versus donating money to a political candidate?
Without firm guidelines, there will be more litigation on this
matter because no one will know where the balance between
disclosure and privacy should fall, and whether there is a range or a
bright line of constitutionality.259 There are two major costs that will
result from this increase in litigation: (1) First Amendment rights,
particularly the right of anonymity, will suffer directly or through
254. Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2836–37 (Scalia, J., concurring) (opining that strict scrutiny should be
applied in cases involving compelled disclosure against protected First Amendment association).
255. Id. at 2839 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 2843 (finding that in Doe v. Reed the information interest should not have been
sufficient to justify compelled disclosure because “[p]eople are intelligent enough to evaluate the
merits of a referendum without knowing who supported it”).
257. See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916 (involving only the financial backers of an
organization producing electioneering communications and how it provided information to
voters); McConnell, 540 U.S. 93, 196–97 (2003); cf. Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2817–19 (involving the
signatures of individuals on a referendum to provide information to voters).
258. The Court did not provide guidance to lower courts on how Citizens United’s nonprofit
status affected compelled disclosure, although nonprofit status is important and lower courts need
to know how to interpret this. See, e.g., Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 234, at 17.
259. See infra Part III.B.
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potential neglect; and (2) repetitious and copious litigation that will
cause lost time and money.260
1. Costly to First Amendment Rights
Because the Court has not defined how lower courts should
analyze compelled disclosure in certain situations, lower courts run
the risk of blindly favoring disclosure regardless of the
circumstances.261 The lower courts may recognize that the Supreme
Court’s holdings in Citizens United and Doe v. Reed favor disclosure
and simply find in favor of disclosure so long as they can find any
justification for it.262
Following Citizens United, lower courts have followed much of
the Supreme Court’s reasoning when assessing disclosure
regulations, overwhelmingly reaching decisions that favor
disclosure.263 These courts have been following the very few
guidelines and exceptions promoted by the Court.264 However, Doe
and Citizens United still provide states and lower courts with
“considerable leeway” to develop and interpret disclosure regulations
as they wish; as a result, courts may find these regulations
constitutional without giving any regard to the anonymity interest.265
The right to anonymity is facing challenges in other areas of the
law, such as communication in cyberspace, which may signify that
anonymity is vulnerable in campaign finance as well.266 The lack of
guidelines for disclosure and privacy in the cyberspace arena and the
potential effects of this deficiency on everyday citizens online is
concerning because cyberspace and campaign finance disclosure

260. See infra Part III.B.
261. See Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 234, at 11 (“Lower courts have been quick to pick up
the new pro-disclosure language from Citizens United and Doe to uphold disclosure laws before
the 2010 election.”).
262. Id. (“Two Circuit Courts have upheld state and federal disclosure laws. Also, seven
federal district courts across the country have upheld state disclosure laws post-Citizens United
and Doe against election eve-challenges in 2010. Again and again, in state after state, federal
courts have come to nearly the identical conclusion that campaign finance disclosure laws are
perfectly constitutional.”).
263. Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 104, at 1086–87.
264. Id. at 1094–98 (referencing the harassment exception from Doe and the de minimis
exception from Citizens United).
265. See id. at 1103; see also Briffault, supra note 12, at 1003, 1005 (2011) (chilling speech
and leaving citizens and corporations to deal with reprisals).
266. See Anne Wells Branscomb. Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to
the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639 (1995).
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laws are becoming intimately intertwined.267 Information about
campaign contributions is already available online in searchable
databases.268 If lawmakers and courts sometimes allow the
anonymity right to go by the wayside without firm conditions for
when this is appropriate, citizens may not be able to insulate
themselves when exercising their right to free speech, or, in the case
of cyberspace, when “serv[ing] some useful public purpose like
whistle-blowing.”269
The anonymity interest in the cyberspace law arena is in a state
of uncertainty because citizens and courts are still trying to determine
how First Amendment rights such as anonymity should be applied to
cyberspace communications.270 There is a debate about whether use
of anonymity online to facilitate frank discussion should prevail over
the threat that this anonymity will allow some people to be rude to,
defraud, or endanger others.271 This conflict about which First
Amendment interests courts should protect demonstrates what can
happen to the anonymity right in the absence of guidelines.272
Senator Jim Exon introduced a bill in the 104th Congress that
would have prohibited anonymous messages online that intended to
“annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass” the receiver.273 Forbidding
anonymous messages would disclose the identity of the sender and
promote accountability, which could benefit the receiver of the
message; however, it could also threaten the sender’s anonymity
right.274 In some cases, an online speaker might require anonymity to
protect herself from retaliation or harm if her identity were
revealed.275 However, courts and lawmakers have established few
guidelines for how to balance disclosure and privacy in
cyberspace.276 This means that these rights could be completely
267. The Internet has “qualitatively transformed the nature of disclosure laws.” Briffault,
supra note 20, at 290 (quoting William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre’s Checkbook: Privacy Costs
of Political Contribution Disclosure, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 11 (2003)).
268. Id. at 291.
269. Branscomb, supra note 266, at 1676.
270. Id. at 1641.
271. Id. at 1665.
272. See id. at 1647–50 (discussing conflicts and debates regarding anonymity in the
cyberspace arena and the Cubby case, which demonstrates how the right of anonymity can be
lost).
273. Id. at 1675 (citing S. 314, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(1)(B) (1995)).
274. See id.
275. Id. at 1642.
276. See id. at 1678–79.
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unprotected and could leave unsuspecting citizens without either the
protection from retaliation or protection from harassment.277
In conclusion, without guidelines—on how to protect the First
Amendment, how to define fundamental First Amendment rights that
need protecting, and how to assess the extent to which these rights
should be protected—these rights could be lost in the future of
campaign finance disclosure.278
2. Costly in Time and Money
Additionally, without guidelines on how to interpret and protect
certain rights, there will be an increase in litigation because lower
courts will need to perform a case-by-case analysis.279 This will be
both time-consuming and expensive.280 Parties will bring case after
case before the lower courts because the Supreme Court’s holdings
in Citizens United and Doe v. Reed were fact specific and did not
provide guidance on how to further interpret the holdings beyond
those facts.281 Each new case will, of course, present a fresh set of
facts, and lower courts attempting to apply the Supreme Court’s
numerous and fractured precedents in unique situations will struggle
to piece together a coherent approach.282 The expense of this
litigation is problematic because many of those wanting to bring
cases will be individuals, not corporations with deep pockets.283
Additionally, this litigation has a high social cost because litigation

277. Id. at 1679 (“Judges and juries must forbear in casting the net of existing laws too wide.
Legislators must be thoughtful in their approach to rigid statutory requirements.”).
278. Also, it should be noted that “guidelines” means specific situational parameters, not
simple even-handed rules. As scholar Anne Wells Branscomb has nicely summarized: “Generic
principles applied uniformly will not suffice to govern the information superhighways of the
future, for the latter will be at least as rich and vast a technological landscape as the many media
we see deployed today. . . . The landlords of cyberspaces will be no more uniformly in agreement
than the landlords of real spaces.” Branscomb, supra note 266, at 1678.
279. Boudin, supra note 5, at 2149 (declaring that the Court’s former holdings, particularly in
Doe v. Reed, were so fact-based and without clear guidelines that lower courts will need to
perform a case-by-case analysis to determine when and to what extent anonymity and disclosure
are necessary).
280. See William A. Taylor, The Economics of a Civil Lawsuit, THEBUSINESSLAWYERS.COM,
www.thebusinesslawyers.com/BBL_News_Articles/Litigation%20Economics%20101.pdf (last
visited Aug. 14, 2013).
281. Id.
282. Boudin, supra note 5, at 2149–50.
283. Some of the biggest cases involving the right of anonymity involve individuals (rather
than corporations). See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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can last for many years, and much of it will not be completed before
the next election.284
In this area of the law, which needs clear interpretation, the
Court chose not to provide needed guidelines.285 The Court will
likely continue a tradition of protecting the disclosure interest in
certain situations and protecting the anonymity interest in other
situations, but the law should not be developing erratically.286 As one
scholar asks, “[h]as the tide turned in favor of disclosure?”287
Without a firm and clear framework, the tide could turn forever in
favor of disclosure to the detriment of the anonymity interest.288
C. Lack of Clarity
The third major problem facing the disclosure doctrine in
campaign finance is a lack of clarity in the Court’s holdings. The
Court’s most recent holdings in Citizens United and Doe v. Reed are
both vague289 and overbroad.290 When making decisions centering on
disclosure in campaign finance, future Supreme Court justices must
be cognizant of vagueness and overbreadth to avoid chilling political
speech.291 The framework of other First Amendment cases leads to
the conclusion that overly broad and vague laws are extremely
problematic and possibly unconstitutional.292 In earlier campaign

284. For instance, if litigation is not resolved before the next election, then advocacy groups
will still need to display their name on electioneering communications, such as advertisements
before the election. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 867, 915 (2010).
285. Id. at 918–19 (Roberts, J., concurring) (“[S]ometimes it is necessary to decide more.
There is a difference between judicial restraint and judicial abdication.”).
286. See id. at 920.
287. See Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 104.
288. This issue develops because the lower courts have been following the Supreme Court’s
holdings in favor of compelled disclosure. Id. at 1086–87.
289. A law that does not clearly explain to a reasonable person what forms or content of
speech are prohibited is considered unconstitutionally “vague.” GREGORY E. MAGGS & PETER J.
SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 902 (2d ed. 2011). A law must
mean what it says and must provide notice to the public that certain conduct or speech is
prohibited. Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
Revisited, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279, 284 (2003).
290. There are two types of overbreadth claims—those that are invalid as applied and those
that are challenged facially and invalid when applied to others. MAGGS & SMITH, supra note 289,
at 903. Any law can be invalidated on its face if it is overly broad unless there is sufficient
justification for the law. Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 800 (1984); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 67 (1981).
291. See sources cited supra note 249.
292. Schad, 452 U.S. at 66 (finding that certain laws are unconstitutional because they “deter
privileged activit[ies],” such as chilling protected free speech).
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finance cases such as McConnell, the Court expressly used the
vagueness doctrine to hold that the electioneering standard developed
in Buckley allowed BCRA to be constitutional under the vagueness
doctrine.293
Despite the Court’s awareness of previous decisions that were,
in retrospect, overly vague or broad, its recent holdings have been
flawed in the same way.294 As discussed in the previous section, the
Court’s most recent cases regarding the disclosure doctrine have
varied holdings and failed to provide usable guidelines for
lawmakers and judges to apply when balancing disclosure and
privacy.295 Individual holdings, such as in Citizens United, do not
provide any greater specificity.296
The Court’s guidelines for applying the disclosure doctrine in
Citizens United do not provide much specificity beyond the facts at
issue and, as such, this holding may have the same chilling effect as
vague statutory laws.297 Overly broad and vague holdings can chill
lawful conduct in the same manner as overly broad and vague
legislation because the effect on citizens and corporations is the
same.298 When citizens are not sure of the guidelines for acceptable
disclosure, they may refrain from speaking altogether, choosing not
to risk the penalty.299 On the other hand, citizens may refrain from
fully protecting information because they do not understand what the
disclosure requirements are.300 They might be justified;301 to one
293. Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity: Campaign Finance After
Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 643, 649 (2011) (discussing McConnell v. FEC,
540 U.S. 93, 206 (2003)).
294. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 867, 915 (2010) (rejecting the idea that disclosure
is limited to “express advocacy,” but not specifying what could possibly be excluded).
295. See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916; McConnell 540 U.S. at 196–97; cf. Doe v.
Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2817–19 (2010).
296. The Court’s holding is fact-specific and finds that the disclosure requirements are
constitutional as applied “to a movie broadcast via video-on-demand.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct.
at 916–17 (failing to specify whether the requirements would still be constitutional were the
movie in another form).
297. Vague laws “trap the innocent” because they do not provide warning and do not provide
explicit standards. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). The same may hold
true for vague holding such as this because individuals and corporations may not know when
their speech is subject to disclosure.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 108.
300. Id.
301. Vague laws sometimes deferred to judges and policemen to be implemented on an ad
hoc basis, the same way that the Court’s holdings defer specification to lower courts. See id. at
109.
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judge, certain conduct might violate the doctrine, but to another
judge it may be acceptable.302 This leaves citizens lost as to how to
act, inhibits their First Amendment right to free speech and thus
damages the “integrity of the electoral process,”303 and leaves the
disclosure doctrine in a continual state of unpredictability.
In conclusion, vague court holdings may cause the same
problems as vague or overbroad legislation, compelling speakers to
inhibit their speech.304 So long as the Court’s holdings regarding the
disclosure doctrine in campaign finance fail to provide guideposts for
disclosure requirements, citizens and corporations face intrusion (or
at least inhibition) on their First Amendment right to free speech.305
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
To address the issue posed by the problems described above, the
Court should consider several factors, which will allow the Court to
resolve its prior vacillating decisions with a solid holding that not
only provides direction to balance the paramount interests of
disclosure and privacy, but also maximizes the democratic process in
campaign finance. As an illustration, this Section applies these
factors to a past proposal to create balance in the disclosure doctrine.
A. Method of Analysis
This Article argues that the goal of balancing disclosure and
privacy is to find a space in campaign finance where anonymity and
disclosure coexist to the greatest extent possible: a zone of
constitutionality. Outside of this zone, the law should be considered
per se unconstitutional as violating one of the protected interests.
When lawmakers and judges craft or refine future disclosure laws,
they should ensure that the laws fall within the zone of
constitutionality, by effectively balancing a variety of factors for
disclosure and privacy.

302.
303.
304.
305.

See id.
Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2819 (2010).
See Supra Part III.C.
Id.

690

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:651

1. The Zone of Constitutionality
“Zones” are found in many areas of law.306 In constitutional law,
for example, Justice Jackson in his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer defined three distinct zones of presidential
authority.307 According to Jackson, the President’s power was “at its
lowest ebb” if he was not acting within one of the first two zones.308
Moreover, in due process and economic due process cases, the Court
has adopted a “zone of reasonableness” standard.309 This zone makes
assessing regulations easier for the Court because the zone has
clearly delineated criteria for rate structures.310 Also, it is notable that
Buckley itself alluded to a zone of constitutionality.311
The Court should likewise find a zone within the disclosure
doctrine in order to reconcile the competing interests of disclosure
and privacy.312 A law should be within this zone if it protects both
disclosure and privacy interests.313 This should not be a bright-line
test where a law must equally protect disclosure interests and privacy
interests.314 Nor should it be a test where each disclosure law must be

306. See infra Part IV.A.1.
307. 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (describing the three zones of
presidential authority as: (1) acting pursuant to an implied or express authorization from
Congress; (2) acting in absence of a Congressional grant or denial of authority; and (3) acting
incompatibly with the express or implied will of Congress).
308. Id.
309. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 765–68 (1997) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (regarding a zone of reasonableness); McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 157–58
(1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 397 (1981) (White, J.,
dissenting) (characterizing majority’s holding) (1981); George S. Ford & Lawrence J. Spiwak,
The Need for Better Analysis of High Capacity Services, 28 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO.
L. 343, 370 (2011) (finding the “Zone of Reasonableness” to be such that “the order may
reasonably be expected to maintain financial integrity, attract necessary capital, and fairly
compensate investors for the risks they have assumed, and yet provide appropriate protection to
the relevant public interest, both existing and foreseeable.” (quoting In re Permian Basin Area
Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 792 (1968))).
310. In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. at 790–92.
311. See Kenneth J. Levit, Note, Campaign Finance Reform and the Return of Buckley v.
Valeo, 103 YALE L.J. 469, 503 (1993).
312. This holding would be similar to Justice Jackson’s zones where he clearly defined the
areas of presidential action that was unconstitutional: anything outside of the first two zones.
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–38. In this case, any disclosure regulation law outside of the zone
of constitutionality is per se unconstitutional.
313. For a disclosure law to be within the zone of constitutionality it does not need to protect
both disclosure and privacy interests fully in all cases. However, it must ensure that the
anonymity interest is not disregarded altogether.
314. See, e.g., Joseph D. Herrold, Note, Capturing the Dialogue: Free Speech Zones and the
“Caging” of First Amendment Rights, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 949, 991–92 (2006) (explaining how a
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sure to protect disclosure and privacy interests consistently,
regardless of the situation. For instance, a law that seeks to require
disclosure of large donations from corporations may not need to
require as much privacy protection as another law that requires
disclosure of small donations from individual citizens.315
Therefore, the zone of constitutionality should strive to be an
area where myriad laws with divergent objectives may find a proper
balance, protecting disclosure and privacy interests to differing
degrees depending on the circumstances and players. This zone
would allow flexibility and breathing room for judges and lawmakers
while ensuring that both interests are protected.316 As with other
zones in the past, it will need to be developed by the Court.317
2. Factors
There are eight factors that the legislature should consider when
drafting a disclosure law. These factors will help avoid the past
problems of imbalance, variability, and vagueness. If the legislature
considers all of these factors, the law will be within the zone of
constitutionality and, therefore, presumptively constitutional.318
First, the legislature should consider monetary thresholds when
creating disclosure regulations.319 This factor is the leading factor,
and many scholars have touched on it before.320 Richard Briffault,
for example, has suggested that disclosure requirements should be
applicable only to large donations from “major actors.”321 Setting a
bright line threshold seems fairly arbitrary, but Briffault suggests that
the informational interest is not advanced by public disclosure of
donors who give less than $1,000 to presidential candidates.322 The
zone application can be more effective than a bright-line test, especially when the matter is
fact-intensive).
315. The Court has recognized in the past that the information interest is not as compelling
against anonymity rights for small donations as it is for large donations. Torres-Spelliscy, supra
note 234, at 14.
316. One of the reasons for the use of zones in other areas of law is the need for flexibility
because bright-line tests can be impracticable and lead to absurd distinctions. See Benjamin
Donahue, Case Note, McGarvey v. Whittredge: Continued Uncertainty in Maine’s Intertidal
Zone, 64 ME. L. REV. 593, 608 (2012).
317. See Ford & Spiwak, supra note 309.
318. See supra Part III.
319. Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 234, at 13 (“Disclosure laws should not trap the unwary or
entangle tiny groups of people spending relatively small amounts of money.”).
320. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 20, at 300.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 301.
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Court should decide the disclosure threshold as a bright line, but it
must remember that a low threshold challenges the privacy of small
donors, while very high thresholds evade the informational interest
for even the largest donors.323 The goal is to find a balance between a
threshold that satisfies the government’s interest in providing
information to the voters and one that is so high as to be a burden on
free speech and freedom of association.324 Currently, BCRA requires
disclosure of independent expenditures of more than $250.325
However, this threshold number was “set in the 1970s and ha[s]
never been adjusted for inflation.”326 To make the informational
interest compelling, the legislature should raise the disclosure
threshold.
Second, the legislature should consider where the donation is
going. Is it going directly to a candidate, or is it funding issue
advocacy? This is the traditional dividing line that the Court has toed
since Buckley in deciding whether contributions are “express
advocacy” or “issue advocacy.”327 The Court has traditionally taken
a very narrow interpretation, limiting the disclosure requirements to
expenditures for candidates or for organizations that clearly support a
particular candidate.328 To ensure consistency, guidance, and
specificity in judicial holdings, the legislature should be sure to
always consider where the money is going and what its purpose is.
This factor is not necessarily determinative; rather it is simply a
factor for the legislature to weigh into the balance. But if the
legislature chooses to restrict the constitutionality of disclosure
requirements to express advocacy for a particular candidate, then the
legislature should consistently consider this factor along those
restricting lines.
Third, the legislature should consider the nature of the
campaign.329 This distinction is separate from differentiating between
issue advocacy and express advocacy. For example, is this direct
323. The lower the amount spent, the lower the information value to voters and the lower the
state’s interest in compelling disclosure. See Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 193, at 14 (noting that
the 10th Circuit adopted this logical chain).
324. See id.
325. 2 U.S.C. § 434(c)(1) (2005).
326. See Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 234, at 13.
327. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 41–44 (1976) (per curiam).
328. See id.
329. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2827 (2010) (Sotomayor, J. concurring) (“[W]e must be
mindful of the character of initiatives and referenda.”).
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democracy (voting to enact) or representative democracy (voting to
elect)? Doe v. Reed is an example of a case that involves direct
democracy because a group of citizens had signed a referendum
petition putting legislation on the ballot for voter approval.330 The
Court’s decision to uphold the disclosure of the referendum
petitioners’ names took into account the nature of the campaign and
the citizens’ involvement with the election.331 This case may have
been decided differently had it involved representative democracy
because the courts already allow the states leeway to regulate direct
democracy (such as the subjects to be on the ballot and the number
of signatures required).332 Therefore, this is an important factor for
the legislature to consider when drafting disclosure laws because the
Court has already recognized that regulation of direct democracy
does not impair political speech.333
Fourth, although seemingly self-evident, the legislature should
consider the nature of the issue in the case. Is it a social issue or an
economic issue? If the case involves a petition advocating a social
cause, the Court’s reasons for favoring privacy may be stronger
because the effects on those involved might be more personal and
harmful.334 As in Patterson and more recently with Proposition 8 in
California,335 social issues can be extremely stigmatizing in
communities, and speaking out about a controversial issue could
result in violent or harmful retribution.336 The legislature must be
mindful of the type of issue at hand and the fact that the reasons for
330. Id. at 2816 (majority opinion).
331. Id. at 2818 (“Petition signing remains expressive even when it has legal effect in the
electoral process. But that is not to say that the electoral context is irrelevant to the nature of [the
Court’s] First Amendment review.”).
332. For example, Sotomayor’s concurrence indicates that states have “considerable leeway”
to determine which issues will be placed on the ballot. Id. at 2827 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(“These mechanisms of direct democracy are not compelled by the Federal Constitution.”).
333. Id. at 2828–29 (stating that most referendum petitions are signed in public and the
expressive act of signing a petition is modest).
334. Emotions run high regarding social issues and individuals taking part in controversial
matters may need the state’s protection of privacy to protect their reputation or safety. See, e.g.,
Rachel Abramowitz & Tina Daunt, Prop. 8 Rifts Put Industry on Edge: Hollywood Is at Odds
over Whether to Shun Supporters of the Ban, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2008, at A1.
335. California’s constitutional amendment to outlaw same-sex marriage. Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 930 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671
F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012).
336. Id. at 935 (“Social epidemiologist Ilan Meyer . . . explained that Proposition 8
stigmatizes gays and lesbians because it informs gays and lesbians that the State of California
rejects their relationships as less valuable than opposite-sex relationships.”).
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protecting the privacy of donors in certain issues may be stronger
than in other cases.
Fifth, the legislature should consider whether there is a history
of violence or retaliation against individuals or corporations
involved, or whether minority groups are affected. For example,
Patterson centered mostly on racial hatred toward members of the
NAACP.337 When drafting a disclosure law, the legislature may want
to leave anonymity exceptions for groups that can demonstrate a
history of violence against them because these groups may remain
more vulnerable to attack. Another example is the immigrant
community in the United States.338 Immigrants lack political power
because they are a minority group and have “historically been
lightning rods for fear and loathing among the general public.”339
Given this history, groups such as immigrants may need the
legislature’s protection from the retribution and the restricted speech
that follows disclosure.
Sixth, the legislature should consider whether the donor
financing at issue is direct or indirect.340 Excessive disclosure can
have a chilling effect, and perhaps restricting disclosure to only
direct contributions will reduce this inhibition.341 Disclosure of
indirect financing, such as donating to an intermediary, may have a
less chilling effect on political speech.342 The donor may feel
protected, for example, with the result that he may not second-guess
his decision to donate. Thus, within the zone of constitutionality,
disclosure requirements for indirect financing donors may not need
as much protection from the privacy interest and may allow more
people to be involved in politics and enrich the political debate.343

337. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 452 (1958).
338. Kevin R. Johnson, A Handicapped, Not “Sleeping,” Giant: The Devastating Impact of
the Initiative Process on Latina/o and Immigrant Communities, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1262
(2008).
339. Id. at 1263.
340. Although Buckley did not distinguish between indirect and direct contributions. Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 78 (1976).
341. McGeveran, supra note 175, at 876.
342. Individuals see their political views to be highly personal, and those who want to retain a
reputation as being apolitical or want to avoid confrontation with colleagues may feel more
comfortable contributing to an organization rather than directly to a candidate. See id. at 876–77.
343. See id. at 877 (“We should want to encourage all different forms of involvement . . .
because broader participation enriches the debate for all of us and opens avenues of political
self-realization for individuals.”).
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Seventh, the legislature should consider, in individual cases,
whether the donor at issue has already been identified with a specific
issue or candidate. If a contributor has already given public support
for a particular candidate or issue, there may be little chilling effect
on his speech by “disclosing” his support because the information is
already available. A person’s or a corporation’s need for privacy
protection stems mostly from a fear of retribution.344 However, if a
person has already been publicly identified with a particular political
issue, then this fear of retribution via disclosure laws may be
misplaced.
Lastly, the legislature should consider whether the donor is
already heavily regulated, such as in the case of large corporations
and labor unions.345 Disclosure requirements may have very little
effect on these donors, either because they are heavily restricted in
how they can donate in the first place, or because their donations are
already effectively disclosed.346 Many corporations are already
public entities, which essentially means that “[c]orporate anonymity
is a contradiction in terms in a further sense as well.”347 In cases such
as these, the legislature should be careful about asserting that a
certain law is within or outside of the zone of constitutionality when
the law will not have an effect on the corporation or labor union
anyway. The legislature should consider whether disclosure is
required by other laws, such as securities laws or labor laws, when it
assesses whether the donor is already regulated. For example, in
securities law, the Dodd-Frank Act has disclosure requirements for
credit rating agencies in order to preserve stability in the United
States’ finances.348
344. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
345. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532 (1945) (“That the State has power to regulate
labor unions with a view to protecting the public interest is, as the Texas court said, hardly to be
doubted.”).
346. For example, hospitals, colleges, secondary schools, and health maintenance
organizations are already highly regulated. 1 WILLIAM W. BASSET ET AL., RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 3:45 (2009). Securities are also highly regulated. 18A AM. JUR.
2D Corporations § 410 (2013).
347. Daniel Winik, Citizens Informed: Broader Disclosure and Disclaimer for Corporate
Electoral Advocacy in the Wake of Citizens United, 120 YALE L.J. 622, 661–63 (2010) (arguing
that “privacy has historically been bound up with personhood and the trappings of personhood”
and “corporations lack the kind of dignitary interests that justify privacy for individuals”).
348. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th
Congress, §§ 111, 152, 1011 (2010); Troy S. Brown, Legal Political Moral Hazard: Does the
Dodd-Frank Act End Too Big to Fail?, 3 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1, 40 (2012).
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In sum, these eight factors should provide guidance to
legislatures as they seek to balance disclosure and privacy when
drafting disclosure laws. If the legislature considers each factor when
creating disclosure regulations, the resulting regulations should fall
within the zone of constitutionality. The benefit of this zone
approach is that there is no bright line—only room for the legislature
to act. The legislature would only act unreasonably when it fails to
consider all of the relevant factors.349
As a mechanical matter, the legislature has the power to make a
law prescribing these factors.350 However, it is impracticable for
Congress to pre-determine how these factors will be applied in any
given situation. Therefore, to best utilize these factors, Congress
could take one of three approaches. First, Congress could legislate
the basic disclosure requirements but then delegate351 to a relevant
agency (such as the FEC) the ability to authorize exceptions to the
disclosure requirements on a case-by-case basis using the eight
factors. In this case, the agency would be carrying out Congress’s
goal of protecting disclosure in some cases and privacy in others.
Using its expertise, the agency could then enforce the legislation by
allowing exceptions consistent with the parameters established by
these factors.352
Alternatively, Congress could incorporate the basic
requirements into its disclosure law but then allow a defense to
violation (and prosecution by the FEC) based on the eight factors.353
Or, finally, Congress could choose not to apply the statute ad hoc.
Rather, the statute itself would distinguish among the factors and
give clear and specific guidelines for exceptions from disclosure
requirements. This would not require any involvement from the
349. And the Court would have to determine whether this legislation is unconstitutional
because it is not within the zone of constitutionality.
350. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
351. Generally, Congress can delegate its rulemaking power to the executive branch so long
as it provides an intelligible principle. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472
(2001); see also Ron Beal, Ad Hoc Rulemaking: Texas Style, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 101, 103
(1989); Gary J. Greco, Standards or Safeguards: A Survey of the Delegation Doctrine in the
States, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 567, 568 (1994).
352. See 73 C.J.S. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE § 68 (“A legislative body
may delegate to an administrative body the authority to adopt and enforce reasonable rules for
implementing or carrying out the purposes of a statute or ordinance, or to promulgate subordinate
rules within specified limits.”).
353. The FEC has broad discretionary power to decide how to investigate claims, including
civil enforcement and prosecution. See Nader v. FEC, 823 F. Supp. 2d 53, 58 (D.D.C. 2011).

Spring 2015]

BALANCING DISCLOSURE

697

courts or administrative agencies, but it would also leave less room
for individuals and organizations to claim that they should not fall
under disclosure requirements. This final approach is likely the
superior method because it allows the legislature to precisely
establish the elements that make an individual or organization
exempt from disclosure requirements, but any of the three
approaches could prove highly effective.
B. Exemplifying the Method by Applying It
to a Recent Proposal
To illustrate how a court could apply the above factors to
disclosure legislation, this section applies the factors to the Disclose
Act of 2012.354 By considering these factors when determining
whether this legislation is within the zone of constitutionality, this
section concludes that the act is constitutional.
1. Disclose Act 2.0
The Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending
in Elections Act of 2012 (“Disclose Act 2.0”)355 replaced the
Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in
Elections Act of 2010 (the “Disclose Act of 2010”), which was
defeated by the Senate in 2010.356 Democrat Chris Van Hollen, who
introduced the bill to the House, intended the Disclose Act of 2010 to
amend FECA and establish additional disclosure requirements for
organizations such as labor unions, corporations, and Super PACs.357
Sponsors of the bill created it in response to Citizens United and
included many new provisions for campaign expenditures.358
Disclose Act 2.0 was created following the earlier bill’s demise
and with the same goal as its predecessor: to revise FECA and

354. Bill Summary & Status, 111th Cong. (2009–2010), H.R. 5175, All Information,
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR05175:@@@L&
summ2=m& (last updated June 24, 2010).
355. S. 3369, 112th Cong. (2012).
356. Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections Act (DISCLOSE
Act), H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2010); Linda Pall, Corporate Citizens and Political Speech: The
Perils Surrounding A Supreme Court Game-Changer: Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, 558 U.S. 50 (2010), 53 ADVOCATE 32, 34 (2010).
357. H.R. 5175.
358. However, the act exempted many large-member groups such as the National Rifle
Association and AARP. Pall, supra note 356, at 34.
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increase campaign finance disclosure requirements.359 Disclose Act
2.0 required disclosure of the identity of large campaign contributors
and spenders.360 For contributions over $10,000 to § 527 or § 501(c)
electioneering organizations, the organization must certify that the
spending is not being made in coordination with a candidate and
must reveal the identity of the sponsor “so that the actual sources of
funds being spent to influence federal elections will be known.”361 At
the time the bill was first introduced, supporters argued that these
disclosure requirements would deter corporate spending.362
Additionally, the act, which has not yet passed, would “achieve . . .
transparency without imposing any unconstitutional burdens on
political speakers.”363
To avoid the faults of its decisions in the past when analyzing
the Disclose Act (assuming the act becomes law), the Court should
achieve a balance between disclosure and privacy, provide guidelines
for future courts and lawmakers to interpret the act, and avoid
vagueness in its holding. A balance between disclosure and privacy
that falls outside of the zone of constitutionality should be
unconstitutional. If a zone approach is followed, a challenged law
would be facially unconstitutional only where the legislature
neglected relevant factors. Where the factors are overtly invoked, at
most a law would be unconstitutional as applied to particular facts.
2. Is the Act Constitutional?
First, the Court should consider whether or not the disclosure
threshold is high enough that the anonymity interest of small donors
is not sacrificed.364 Disclose Act 2.0 raises the disclosure threshold to
$10,000.365At present, federal law requires that donor identity be
359. S. 3369, 112th Cong. (2012).
360. FAQ Disclose Act 2.0, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, www.lwv.org/content/faq-disclose
-act-2012 (last visited Aug. 15, 2013).
361. Id.; S. 3369, 112th Cong. § 324(a)(2) (2012).
362. T.W. Farnam, The Influence Industry: Disclose Act Could Deter Involvement in
Elections, WASH. POST (May 13, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2
010/05/12/AR2010051205094.html.
363. J. Adams Skaggs, Letter to Senate Urging Support for the Disclose Act of 2012,
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST. N.Y.U (July 13, 2012), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/747ede
fd3f8454143a_4zm6bhetn.pdf.
364. See Levit, supra note 311 and accompanying text.
365. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th
Congress, §§ 111, 152, 1011 (2010); Brown, supra note 348, at 40; see also supra text
accompanying note 347.
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disclosed for donations greater than $200 to election candidates.366 A
threshold this low clearly raises concerns for protecting the
anonymity interest. Additionally, small donations have a
proportionally smaller effect on elections, and so their contribution to
the informational interest is low.367 Raising the threshold would
abate the privacy and disclosure concerns because only larger donors
would be affected.368 Although large donors are not immune to
reprisals, due to their immense wealth, they are likely less
vulnerable, especially to economic retaliation.369 Disclose Act 2.0’s
higher disclosure threshold would likely be within the zone of
constitutionality because this limit allows the information interest to
outweigh the anonymity interest.
The next relevant factor is whether minority groups are affected
by the act.370 The Court should consider the fact that this act
specifically targets contributions by corporations, labor unions and
super PACs.371 Privacy is favored when a law has a high potential to
chill speech by members of minority groups.372 However,
corporations, labor unions, and super PACs,373 given their large
numbers and comparatively deep pockets, are unlikely to have the
same fear of reprisal that chills speech within minority groups.374
Therefore, the Court should weigh as favoring disclosure the fact that
the act will not directly affect minority groups of citizens. Another
relevant factor is the nature of the donor entity and whether the donor
entity is already heavily regulated. In this case, since the act affects
only corporations and labor unions, its chilling effect would be
366. Briffault, supra note 12 at 983, 1003–04.
367. Id.
368. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
369. Briffault, supra note 12, at 1005 (adding that Justice Scalia has suggested that “it is not
entirely inappropriate that large donors be ready to justify their actions publicly”).
370. See supra notes 337–39 and accompanying text.
371. S. 2219, 112th Cong. (2012) (“Provide[s] for additional disclosure requirements for
corporations, labor organizations, Super PACs and other entities, and for other purposes.”).
372. See supra notes 340–43 and accompanying text.
373. Super PACs (Political Action Committees) differ from regular PACs because they can
take and spend unlimited amounts of money including donations from corporate treasury
accounts. Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 104, at 1085.
374. See, e.g., About: Who We Are, UNITED AUTO WORKERS, http://www.uaw.org/page/who
-we-are (last visited August 15, 2013) (stating that the United Auto Workers union has more than
390,000 active members in the United States); Apple Reports Fourth Quarter Results, APPLE
(Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2012/10/25Apple-Reports-Fourth-Quarter
-Results.html (stating that Apple posted a quarterly revenue of $36 billion in the fourth quarter of
2012).
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relatively low; these organizations are already heavily monitored and
regulated.375 There is no need for the disclosure laws to repeat
regulation that already exists, such as securities regulation,376
because of the potential for this regulation to also infringe upon
anonymity rights.
In sum, in this hypothetical analysis, Disclose Act 2.0 would
probably be found constitutional because the threshold is high
enough to advance the information interest without hurting the
anonymity interest and because the act seeks to regulate
organizations whose large memberships and comparative wealth
would allow them to deflect attack.377 Since the zone of
constitutionality allows the Court to weigh either disclosure or
privacy more heavily depending on the factors at issue, the Court has
more leeway to lean in one direction—in this case toward disclosure.
The factors introduced earlier provide a for the Court to follow in
determining when to give one interest slightly more weight than the
other interest without harming one. This system should be
distinguished from the Court’s current ad hoc interpretation of
disclosure regulations because application of each of the eight factors
will favor either the anonymity interest or the information interest.
However the Court must consider each interest within certain
parameters.
3. Is the Act Good Policy?
In addition to being constitutional, disclosure requirements are
good policy because they provide valuable information to voters.378
However, Disclose Act 2.0, by substantially raising the disclosure
thresholds, would allow the Court to focus on finding a balance that
maximizes the purpose of disclosure in the first place: to inform the
public about who is funding their elections.379 If the thresholds
remain low, the Court will always need to pay attention to protecting
individuals, small businesses, and even large corporations from

375. See 12 EMP. COORD. LABOR RELATIONS § 70:1 (2012); 18A AM. JUR. 2d Corporations
§ 410 (2004); supra Part IV.A.2.
376. See supra notes 310–13.
377. See supra pp. 63–65.
378. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
379. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text (finding that the purpose of disclosure is
to inform the public about who is funding their elections).
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hostility and retaliation.380 As Richard Briffault has written, “[T]here
is no obvious constitutional standard for setting the balance between
these privacy and publicity—and anonymity and accountability—
concerns.”381
It is important to remember that disclosure laws were created to
control increased political spending in campaigns.382 Disclosure laws
are used to regulate this spending, rather than stop it altogether, and
are the primary means used to achieve this end.383 When the Court
balances the interests of disclosure with those of privacy in assessing
disclosure laws, it must not be hindered to the extent that the purpose
for the law is lost. Raising the disclosure threshold is good policy
because it allows the Court to focus on its primary goal of facilitating
democracy with an involved electorate.384 However, lawmakers
could use methods other than thresholds to achieve this same goal.385
For instance, even where exemption is not required by the fifth
factor, organizations with a history of reprisals, threats, or
harassment could be exempt from the disclosure requirements.386
Congress initially set lower monetary thresholds for disclosure
in order to prevent candidates from “bundling” small donations
together without having to disclose their sources.387 Theoretically,
the lower the contribution limit, the more difficult it is for a
candidate to raise money, or to raise money in an effective and
efficient manner.388 However, bundlers have allowed campaign
contributors to avoid contribution limits by aggregating small
donations in increments.389 Therefore, while a substantially lower
disclosure threshold may hinder bundler donations, the cost to small
contributors is potentially very high and future disclosure regulations
should err on this side of higher thresholds.
380. See supra Part IV.A.2.
381. Briffault, supra note 12, at 1003.
382. Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 104, at 1102–03.
383. Id.
384. See Johnstone, supra note 176, at 434 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92–93
(1976) (per curium)) (noting that the point of urging disclosure is to increase “public discussion
and participation in the electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing people”).
385. See supra Part IV.A.2.
386. See Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 104, at 1103–04.
387. Id.
388. See id. (quoting PETER J. WALLISON & JOEL M. GORA, BETTER PARTIES, BETTER
GOVERNMENT: A REALISTIC PROGRAM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 43 (2009)).
389. Anthony J. Gaughan, The Futility of Contribution Limits in the Age of Super PACs, 60
DRAKE L. REV. 755, 797 (2012).
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In sum, Disclose Act 2.0 is both constitutional and relatively
good policy. Because the Disclose Act of 2010 and the Disclose Act
2.0 of 2012 have been unsuccessful, perhaps a similar disclosure law
will be proposed soon.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has failed to protect both First Amendment
disclosure and privacy interests in campaign finance disclosure
cases.390 Even worse, it has failed to provide a usable framework for
lower court judges and lawmakers to assess whether disclosure laws
are appropriately balancing these two protected interests.391 Unless
the Court corrects these ills in the disclosure doctrine, citizens and
corporations will risk losing their First Amendment rights and the
goal of an effective democracy.392 By remembering the reason for
disclosure requirements and keeping in mind a prescribed list of
factors, the Court can consistently and clearly balance disclosure and
privacy in a constitutional manner.393 In the post-Citizens United era
with swelling campaign donations and increased momentum for
disclosure,394 the Court’s actions could have vast consequences.395
The best the Court can do is balance disclosure and privacy interests
in such a way that neither is neglected and both are protected, and
enlighten others with its method. If this is accomplished, perhaps the
next century of disclosure doctrine will be less unpredictable than the
last.

390. See supra Part II; Part III.A.
391. See supra Part III.B.
392. See supra Part II.
393. See supra Part IV.
394. See Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 104 (concluding that “[t]he tide has turned in favor of
campaign finance disclosure”).
395. See supra Part IV.

